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Fuel Cyde to Nowhere: US Law and Policyon Nudear Waste
Richard Burleson Stewart and Jane Bloom Stewart
Vanderbilt University Press, 2011; 446 pages; $75 (hardback); ISBN 978 0826517746
Nuclear power remains controversial on many levels. On the up side, the lifecycle
emissions for nuclear power are second lowest only to wind in comparison to
all other primary sources of electricity generation.' Nuclear power compares
favourably against coal-generated electricity on additional fronts including fewer
transport impacts2 and lower historical radiation releases. 3 Its land footprint per
kilowatt hour is the smallest for any generation source, including renewables.4
Last, but not least, the United States, a huge consumer of electricity, has
significant domestic reserves of uranium to fuel the plants.On the down side, the civilian nuclear power industry is not competitive
in the United States (some would argue not viable) despite the advantages
of being developed through military research funding and almost 60 years
of liability caps, 6 loan guarantees and government infusions of cash.'
I

2

3
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Roland M Frye Jr, 'The Current Nuclear Renaissance in the United States, Its
Underlying Reasons, and its Potential Pitfalls' (2008) 29 Energy LJ 279, 299 (6 grams of
CO 2 per kilowatt hour, citing the International Energy Agency).
William Tucker, TerrestrialEnergy(Barleby Press, 2008), 38 ('Every three days, a 110-car
unit train a-rives [at a 500MW plant south of Omaha] each car is loaded with 125 tons of
coal'. In contrast, 'Every 18 months, a single tracker trailer arrives carrying several dozen
bundles of 18-foot nuclear fuel rods to the 750MW nuclear plant 12 miles away').
Fred Bosselman, 'The Ecological Advantages of Nuclear Power' (2007) 15 NYU
Environmental LJ 1, 35 ('Uranium, radium, and thorium found in coal are naturally
radioactive elements, and it is estimated that 500 tons of uranium are left in the ash
produced by coal-fired power plants each year, some of which will decay, releasing
radon gas. The amounts of radioactivity involved are probably harmless, but the
amount of radioactivity released by a coal-fired power plant exceeds that of a nuclear
power plant, a fact that few people realize'). See also,Jeff Goodell, Big Coal: the Dirty
Secret Behind America's Energy Future (Mariner Books, 2007), xii.
KK DuVivier, Renewable Energy Reader (Carolina Academic Press, 2011), 384, Figure 8.10.
US Energy Information Administration, US UraniumReserves Estimates (July 2010), at
www.eia.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/reserves/ures.html accessed 17 February 2012.
Joseph P Tomain and Richard D Cudahy, Energy Law in a Nutshell (2nd edn, West,
2011), 434 (GE threatened withdrawal from nuclear development activity because of
potential liability, so in reaction Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act of 1957, which
limited industry liability in the event of a nuclear accident).
See, eg, Douglas Koplow, 'Nuclear Power Still Not Viable Without Subsidies' (February 2011),
at www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear power/nuclear subsiside-report.pdf; John
M Deutch et al, 'Update on the MIT Interdisciplinary Study 2003 Future of Nuclear Power'
(2009), at http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/pdf/nuclearpower-update2009.pdf accessed
17 February 2012 (baseline costs of nuclear power greater than coal or natural gas, but if
carbon emissions are taxed, then nuclear can become economically competitive).
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Also, before the current nuclear renaissance sparked by government
incentives,' 1978 marked the last year a new nuclear plant was ordered in
the United States, and all plants ordered after 1974 had been cancelled or
9
converted, costing ratepayers billions for utilities' miscalculations.
The cost and safety of nuclear power leaped into the headlines again when
on 11 March 2011, a tsunami struck the Fukushima nuclear reactor facility in
Japan. Hundreds of thousands were evacuated from a 12-mile zone around
the plant, and many will never be able to return to live on or farm this land.
Radioactive releases into the air and sea have contaminated water and food
up to 200 miles from the accident. In addition, some estimates place the
cost of cleaning up the Fukushima disaster and compensating its victims at
as much as US$257bn.' 0
Much of the radiation released during the Fukushima disaster was not from
the power generation part of the reactor, but instead from spent nuclear fuel
(SNF) at the site. The United States has been concerned for decades about
these 'swimming pools in the backyards of the nation's nuclear reactors...
filling up with... deadly radioactive waste'." Richard Burleson Stewart and
Jane Bloom Stewart tackle the disposal issues of SNF and other wastes from
nuclear power generation and nuclear weapons in their book Fuel Cycle to
Nowhere: US Law and Policy on Nuclear Waste (hereinafter Fuel Cycle) ."
Thirty-nine US states currently contain nuclear wastes at 129 different sites including commercial nuclear reactor sites, a commercial storage site, research
sites and US Department of Energy sites." Tens of thousands of tonnes of SNF
are stored at power plants across the United States,1 4 and at least 77 of these
plants are 'without a disposal destination or even a plan for one'.
Fuel Cycle is billed as a 'comprehensive history and overview of US nuclear
waste law and regulation'," and it certainly appears to have been a massive
Frye, note 1 above.
Tomain and Cudahy, note 6 above, 462-469. (Furthermore, the cost of decommissioning
and dismantling spent nuclear plants is estimated at US$500m per plant.)
10 'Japan sees atomic power cost up by at least 50 pct by 2030 - Nikkei' (Reuters,
6 December 2011), at www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/06/japan-nuclear-costidUSL3E7N60MR2011120 accessed 17 February 2012; see also Mycle Schneider,
Antony Froggatt and Steve Thomas, 'The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 20102011: Nuclear Power in a Post-Fukushima World' (Worldwatch Institute, April 2011),
2
at www.worldwatch.org/system/files/WorldNuclearlndustryStatusReport 0ll_%20
FINAL.pdf accessed 18 February 2012.
11 Pelham, 'Government Groping with Waste Disposal' [1977] CongressionalQuarterly2555.
12 Richard Burleson Stewart andJane Bloom Stewart, Fuel Cycle to Nowhere: US Law and
Policy on Nuclear Waste (Vanderbilt, 2011).
13 Tomain and Cudahy, note 6 above, 462.
14 Stewart and Stewart, note 12 above, 5.
15 Ibid 2.
16 Ibid frontjacket cover.
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undertaking. This tome contains an introductory table of approximately 140
nuclear acronyms and 305 pages of text, supported by 81 pages of detailed
reference notes.
Chapter 1 deals with 'The Evolution of US Nuclear Waste Law and
Policy'. From a legal perspective, one of the most interesting discussions in
this chapter addresses some of the legal strategies used by nuclear power
opponents." According to the Stewarts, early lawsuits challenged the Atomic
Energy Commission's (AEC's) licensing and regulatory decisions on the
basis of safety. This approach failed to win in the courts, but the costs,
delays and uncertainties created by the litigation were effective deterrents
in many instances.' 8
In the next phase, opponents challenged new reactor licensings based
on the AEC's failure to consider the environmental impacts of storage
and disposal of nuclear wastes. This line of challenges ended when the US
Supreme Court found that the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
had complied with the National Environmental Policy Act and had provided
adequate reasons for its conclusions about waste disposal."
The legal challenges began to have traction when states tied their concerns
about the disposal of wastes to economic outcomes. In response to threats
of a citizen initiative, the California legislature placed a moratorium on
all nuclear plant construction in the state until the wastes had a proper
disposal method.2 0 The legislature justified the moratorium as a way to
protect ratepayers against the high costs of waste disposal.2 ' The utility
that proposed to construct a nuclear plant, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E),
brought suit arguing that the NRC's2 2 permit pre-empted and controlled all
nuclear plant decisions.2 1
PG&E's confidence about winning its lawsuit wasjustified because, before
this case, the Supreme Court had been fairly consistent in giving deference
to NRC decisions as pre-empting state concerns. But the PG&E decision
marked a watershed. The Court sashayed around the pre-emption issue by
stating that the NRC had only occupied the field of 'nuclear safety'. By styling
its legislation as 'economic', California's statute addressed legitimate state
issues that were not pre-empted, and therefore, could stand.2 1
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Ibid 48.
lbid, 51.
Ibid 53 (citing Baltimore Gas & Electric Co v NaturalRes Def Counci4 462 US 87 (1983)).
Ibid 44.
Pacific Gas & Elec Co v State Enery Res Conservation & Dev Comm'n, 461 US 190 (1983);
see also Stewart and Stewart, note 12 above, 55.
42 USCA § 5801 (1974) shifted the AEC's permitting role to the new NRC in 1974.
Pacific Gas, note 21 above, 198.
lbid 212-216.
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After receiving the PG&E green light, at least 13 states followed California's
lead and also enacted moratoria to the construction of new nuclear plants.2 1
These moratoria sounded the death knell for US nuclear development until
the current nuclear renaissance of relicensings26 and government incentives
to develop new nuclear facilities. 27
These relicensings and incentives are tainted in that the problem of
waste disposal still plagues us three decades after PG&E and more than
five decades after the first civilian wastes were generated in the United
States when the Shippingport Reactor in Pennsylvania entered operation
in December 1957.
Furthermore, the responsibility for the nuclear waste problem shifted
from the private companies generating the wastes to the shoulders of every
US taxpayer when Congress mandated that the Department of Energy
(DOE) take ownership of civilian SNF for disposal beginning in 1998.28 To
address these problems and report on possible methods to dispose of nuclear
waste, the Obama administration appointed a Blue Ribbon Commission on
America's Nuclear Future. On 29 July 2011, the Commission issued a draft
of its report and recommendations for public comment.29 Fuel Cycle was
released approximately two weeks later.
In many respects, Fuel Cycleis simply a descriptive report. It was an offshoot of
a project by the Consortium for Risk Evaluation with Stakeholder Participation
25

26

27

28

29

Stewart and Stewart, note 12 above, 55 (Oregon, Maine, Montana, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Kentucky, Kansas, Illinois, NewJersey,
Minnesota and Pennsylvania (many of these laws are still on the books)).
In mid-February 2012, the Vogtle nuclear power plant near Waynesboro, Georgia, received
the first NRC licence approval in more than 30 years. See also Tomain and Cudahy, note
6 above, 444 (61 of the 104 reactors in the US had received 20-year renewals on their
licences); Richard Webster with Julia Le-Mense, '40 Years and Counting: Relicensing the
First Generation of Nuclear Power Plants: Spotlight on Safety at Nuclear Power Plants: The
View from Oyster Creek' (2009) 26 Pace Envt'l L Rev 365; Frye, note 1 above.
Fred Bosselman et al, Energy, Economics and the Environment (3rd edn, Thomson Reuters,
2010) (noting that the Energy Policy Act of 2005 encouraged the building of new
reactors by guaranteeing the Department of Energy would pay up to 100 per cent of
delay costs, including principal and interest on any debt obligation up to US$500m
per reactor for the first two licensed reactors and 50 per cent for the next four.
Also noting that the Obama administration's 1 February 2010 budget proposed an
additional US$36bn in loans for the construction of new nuclear plants, twice as much
as the previous loan guarantee programme), 1014; Tomain and Cudahy, note 6 above
(Obama's budget for 2011 proposed to increased the loan guarantees to US$54bn and
also proposed approximately US$825m to fund research for advanced reactors and
new fuel cycle technologies), 438.
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 97 Pub L 425, 96 Stat 2201, 2257-2261 (1982).
Section 302 mandates that utilities must pay a fee for disposal; see also Stewart and
Stewart, note 12 above, 77.
Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, Draft Report to the Secretary of
Energy (29 July 2011), at http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/brcdraft
report_29jul2011 _O.pdf accessed 26 February 2012.
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(CRESP). CRESP is a Vanderbilt University-led, multi-university consortium
funded by the DOE, Office of Environmental Management.
After the initial overview, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 ofFuel Cycleexhaustively cover
the issues of 'Radioactive Waste Classification', 'Regulation and Nuclear Waste
Transport' and 'Low-Level Waste Disposal', respectively. Although not very
accessible for general audiences, these chapters may be especially valuable
for governmental agencies and initiated insiders who specialise in this area.
However, the tone shifts with Chapters 5 and 6, taking the form of an argument
to support the report's final chapter on conclusions and recommendations, as
illustrated by their titles. Chapter 5 is titled 'WIPP: The Rocky Road to Success',
while Chapter 6 is 'Yucca Mountain: Blueprint for Failure'.

Chapter 5 - WIPP: the rocky road to success
WIPP is the acronym for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New
Mexico. Accordig to the StewarLs, vvPP is 'the only operating deep
geologic repository for disposal of long-lived nuclear waste in the world'.so
The incentive that spurred research into finding a disposal site for defencegenerated transuranic (TRU) wastes was a 1969 fire at the Rocky Flats
nuclear weapons facility in Colorado. By 1975, the federal government had
focused on New Mexico for the disposal site after Carlsbad's political leaders
had actively supported this choice. In May 1998, the US Environmental
Protection Agency issued its final certification of the WIPP, and on 26
March 1999, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson approved delivery of
TRU wastes to the repository."
The pathway from initial conception to actual employment of the WIPP
site for waste disposal was bumpy. The State of New Mexico frequently sought
power to control the choice, even threatening to amend the state constitution
to ban the storage of any imported radioactive wastes.3 1 Although the New
Mexico legislature did not put authorisation of the WIPP to a statewide
referendum nor did it pass an amendment to the state constitution that would
ban the storage of imported radioactive wastes as it had threatened, it did
pass the New Mexico Radioactive Waste Consultation Act. This legislation
prohibited disposal or storage of waste without state concurrence.3 3 Despite
this legislation and some political gestures of conciliation, the federal
government made it clear that New Mexico had no veto authority over a
federal facility on federal lands.
30
31
32
33

Stewart and Stewart, note 12 above, 162.
Ibid 180-181.
lbid 164.
Ibid 166.

342

JOURNAL OF ENERGY & NATURAL RESOURCES

LAw Vol 30 No 3 2012

The Stewarts attribute the ultimate success of the WIPP to 'the step-bystep evolutionary process by which the facility was developed, and the state's
ability to gain leverage in decision making at key stages of the process through
successful litigation that challenged DOE actions and through legislation
won by its congressional delegation'. 34 From the Stewarts' description, two
key components of this process were: (1) a consultation and cooperation
(C&C) agreement; and (2) the Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG).

C&C agreement
After much debate, members of Congress agreed on language in the 1980
WIPP Authorization Act that required the Secretary to 'consult and cooperate
with the appropriate officials of the State of New Mexico, with respect to the
public health and safety concerns'.3 1 In 1981, when the federal government
refused to agree to a legally binding implementation agreement, New Mexico
sued the DOE. This litigation and political pressures within the Reagan
administration convinced the DOE to enter into a stipulated C&C agreement
that guaranteed New Mexico access to DOE data, gave New Mexico additional
clout for enforcing its concerns and established a conflict resolution process. 36
The C&C agreement 'did not immediately produce cooperation' as the DOE
continued to resist its terms.37 However, it did seem to provide a conduit for
much of New Mexico's input into the process.

EEG
The second primary mechanism the Stewarts credit with the success of
the WIPP facility is the EEG. The EEG was an independent scientific body
established through a memorandum of understanding between New
Mexico and the DOE in 1978." 'EEG became a trusted and independent
source of technical expertise. Its willingness to critique flaws in the WIPP
project ultimately worked to reassure the state and other stakeholders of
the repository's technical soundness and to bolster the credibility of the
project.'"3 The Stewarts believe that the EEG was 'the single most effective
reviewer, expositor, and facilitator in the project's multiparty dynamic
structure'. However, the DOE apparently thought the EEG was 'a thorn

34
35
36
37
38
39

Ibid 185.
Ibid 170 (citing § 213(b) (1) of the 1980 WIPP Authorization Act).
Ibid 172-173.
Ibid 173.
Ibid 168.
Ibid 169.
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in its side' and was able to defund it in 2004.
Despite praising the WIPP as a model for success, the Stewarts admit the
result was a 'mixed dynamic of contention and cooperation'.' They also
describe some of the unique background conditions that probably played
as much, if not more, of a role in the WIPP success than the procedural
mechanisms described above: 'Carlsbad's depressed economy, the weakness
of the state economy, and New Mexico's generally positive past and thenpresent experience with federal nuclear activities and facilities within the
state. These favorable conditions may not be replicated in other settings."'
Although New Mexico has indicated that it may be willing to accept SNF
in the future, its past position has been that it would only accept defence
TRU wastes. This is why New Mexico was happy to join others who sought
to railroad SNF to the Yucca site.

Chapter 6 - Yucca Mountain: blueprint for failure
Chapter 6 describes the Yucca Mountain project as a contrasting failure to the
WIPP's success. The Stewarts characterise Yucca as a failure because it 'has been
abandoned'." Later they admit that Yucca's current status as a failure is only
because, in 2008, President Obama deprived the DOE of funding needed to
pursue licensing of the project before the NRC. On 3 March 2010, the DOE
filed a motion seeking permission to withdraw its Yucca Mountain repository
request, but the NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board denied that request on
29June 2010. On 9 September 2011, the NRC issued a memorandum and order
neither overturning nor upholding the board's denial of the DOE's request,
and then suspended the proceeding 21 days later.'
The Yucca Mountain site, located in Nye County, Nevada, approximately 100
miles northwest of Las Vegas, was placed on the shortlist of waste depositories
through a deliberative process set out in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
40
41
42

43
44

Ibid 182.
Ibid 184.
Ibid 184-185. Earlier in the chapter, the Stewarts mention the federal laboratory at
Sandia as part of New Mexico's positive experience with nuclear activities and facilities:
'Because of its role in development of the atomic bomb and the ongoing presence
of government nuclear facilities, including Sandia, in New Mexico, the state was less
averse to hosting defense wastes.' Ibid 164. Additional positive nuclear experiences that
the Stewarts did not specifically mention here are that New Mexico also housed the Los
Alamos laboratory and that New Mexico is second only to Wyoming as the state with
the most uranium reserves. US Energy Information Administration, note 5 above.
Stewart and Stewart, note 12 above, 186.
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 'High-Level Waste Disposal: Update on Status of
High-Level Waste Disposal Program as of September 30, 2011', at www.nrc.gov/waste/
hlw-disposal.html accessed 26 February 2012; Stewart and Stewart, note 12 above, 187,
228, 462-471.
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(NWPA) .4 In many respects, the process described for Yucca does not seem
to diverge significantly from that for the WIPP. In the NWPA, Congress gave
states a greater say than New Mexico had to veto the project; section 116 of the
NWPA allowed states a right of 'disapproval', which could only be overridden
by a vote from both Houses of Congress. Consequently, when the DOE formally
recommended the Yucca site to President Bush in 2002, Nevada exercised its
right under section 116 and disapproved." However, Nevada was politically
weak at that time, so both houses of Congress overrode Nevada's disapproval.
Section 117 of NWPA provided the same 'consult and cooperate'
language as was in the WIPP Act, and the DOE was required to enter into
negotiation for similar C&C agreements with each state being considered
for the repository.4 7 This reviewer could not find any discussion in Fuel Cycle
where the Stewarts explain why the C&C process in the WIPP situation was
good and why the comparable Yucca process was ineffective. Similarly, no
objective technical advisory group similar to the EEG appears to have been
set up in the Yucca situation, but this reviewer could not find anywhere in
the book where this comparison with WIPP was specifically developed. In
fact, the primary problems and distrust in the Yucca process seems to have
been spawned by political, not technical, stimuli.
In April 1986, the Chernobyl plant exploded, triggering the worst nuclear
power plant disaster in history. The reactor, which was not encased in a
containment vessel, spewed radioactive contaminants throughout Ukraine,
Belarus, Russia and Europe. Over 350,000 people were evacuated, and areas
near the site remain tainted today. Worldwide, the catastrophe undermined
public confidence in the government control of nuclear activities and made it
difficult to find communities willing to embrace anything nuclear, especially
not an untested waste facility.
The Chernobyl accident and a number of other factors converged to
convince the US Congress to short-circuit the deliberative process set
up under the NWPA. 'In light of the delays in meeting the NWPA siting
schedule, escalations in the costs of detailed characterization of the final three
candidate sites, mounting state and local opposition to repositories, growing
SNF inventories, and the looming 1998 deadline for federal assumption of
responsibility for SNF, key members in Congress became convinced that
NWPA needed a drastic overhaul'.18
The rationales for designating Yucca as the sole site for going forward
45
46
47

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub L No 97-425, 96 Stat 2201 (1983), codified as
amended at 42 USC §§ 10101-10270.
Stewart and Stewart, note 12 above, 222.
Ibid 204.

48 Ibid 207.
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as a waste repository may have been good.49 However, the raw politics of
amending the NWPA through a rider to an omnibus budget bill created
outrage. According to the Stewarts, Nevada developed 'a deep and abiding
sense of grievance that fueled its unrelenting and finally successful opposition
to the implementation of the 1987 amendments'.o
Therefore, based on what is presented in Fuel Cycle, it seems as likely
that the success of WIPP and failure of Yucca were both as much a result
of circumstances as they were a result of any particular process. However,
the last chapter, 'Lessons Learned and Future Choices', reiterates some of
the points made in earlier chapters and provides insights. In addition to
recommendations for public input, such as C&C agreements, and designation
of a neutral, technical advisory organisation, such as the EEG, the Stewarts
note, 'WIPP was not developed in accordance with an advance plan. It
proceeded haltingly, step-by-step, through an iterative process of contention
and bargaining'.5 1 In contrast, 'NWPA's unilateral, detailed blueprint for rapid
development of federal SNF and HLW repositories and storage facilities, on
the other hand has proved a failure' . Finally, 'l[c] ontrary to the assumptions
underlying NWPA, it is now clear that attempting to designate a site by fiat
tends to lengthen, not shorten, the siting and development process'.
Perhaps the arguments to support the Fuel Cycle conclusions could have
been better fleshed out if the release of book had not been rushed to coincide
with the Blue Ribbon Commission report timetable. From a non-substantive
perspective, Fuel Cycle would have benefited from more time for editing as
well. The writing contains distracting repetitions and hard-to-track citation
forms. Tighter organisation and more vivid imagery could also have made
this less of a perfunctory report and more of a lasting historical resource. As
it is, this reviewer must agree with Thomas R Wellock's assessment: 'I cannot
recommend it for general reading or classroom use for undergraduates
or graduates. Poor organization and jargon-laden prose make for tedious
reading. ... The book's ostensible strength, its comprehensiveness, produces
a scattered narrative that jumps from one subheading to another.'
But if the goal of the book was to provide input for the Blue Ribbon
Commission, then it may have succeeded. The Commission published its final
49
50
51
52
53
54

Ibid 208 (distance from population centres, adjacent to Nevada test site, geologic and
cultural advantages).
Ibid 208.
Ibid 256.
Ibid 257.
Ibid 274.
Thomas R Wellock, 'Fuel Cycle to Nowhere: US Law and Policy on Nuclear Waste
Environmental History' (2012) 17 EnvironmentalHistory 189, at http://envhis.
oxfordjournals.org/content/17/1/189.short accessed 26 February 2012.
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report to the Secretary of Energy ahead of schedule on 26 January 2012."
The Committee made the following eight recommendations:
1.

A new, consent-based approach to siting future nuclear waste
management facilities.

2.

A new organisation dedicated solely to implementing the waste
management programme and empowered with the authority and
resources to succeed.

3.

Access to the funds nuclear utility ratepayers are providing for the
purpose of nuclear waste management.

4.

Prompt efforts to develop one or more geologic disposal facilities.

5.

Prompt efforts to develop one or more consolidated storage facilities.

6.

Prompt efforts to prepare for the eventual large-scale transport of spent
nuclear fuel and high-level waste to consolidated storage and disposal
facilities when such facilities become available.

7.

Support for continued US innovation in nuclear energy technology
and for workforce development.

8.

Active US leadership in international efforts to address safety, waste
management, non-proliferation and security concerns.5 6

Some of the Fuel Cycle recommendations seem to have been incorporated
into the final report, especially with respect to recommendations 1 and 2.
For example, under recommendation 1 (the consent-based approach to
siting), the July draft of the Commission report contained some language
that anticipated the Fuel Cycle advice - such as recommending an 'adaptive,
staged, and consent-based' approach to siting that might be 'slow and openended' as well as 'frustrating'. Furthermore, the draft report noted that
'l[e] xperience, however, leads us to conclude that there is no short-cut, and that
any attempt to short-circuit the process will most likely lead to more delay'."
The final Commission report goes on to reflect more of the Fuel Cycle
advice with respect to legally enforceable C&C agreements. For example,
the final report states:
'It would be desirable for these negotiations to result in a partnership
agreement or some other form of legally enforceable agreement with
the organization to ensure that commitments to and by host states,
Mark Holt, Congressional Research Service, NuclearEner Policy (10 May 2011), at
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33558.pdf accessed 26 February 2012 (according to its
charter, the Commission's report was due in March 2012).
56 Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, Report to the Secretary ofEnergy
(26January 2012), vii, at www.brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/brc-finalreport
jan2012.pdf accessed 26 February 2012.
57 Ibid x.
55
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tribes, and communities are upheld. All affected levels of government
must have, at a minimum, a meaningful consultative role in important
decisions; additionally, both host states and tribes should retain or where appropriate, be delegated - direct authority over aspects
of regulation, permitting, and operations where oversight below the
federal level can be exercised effectively and in a way that is helpful
in protecting the interests and gaining the confidence of affected
communities and citizens. At the same time, host state, tribal and local
governments have responsibilities to work productively with the federal
government to help advance the national interest. In this context, any
process that is prescribed in detail upfront is unlikely to work.'"
Likewise, recommendation 2 of the final Commission report, concerning
the creation of a new organisation to implement the waste management
programme, seems to have benefited from the Stewarts' insights. Although
the new organisation does not seem to be as independent and scienceorien ied as the EEG, the Commission appreciates that a neutral organisation
with technical expertise can help dispel distrust and create confidence in
the process. For example, the final report states:
'For the new organization to succeed, a substantial degree of
implementing authority and assured access to funds must be paired
with rigorous financial, technical, and regulatory oversight by
Congress and the appropriate government agencies. We recommend
that the organization be directed by a board nominated by the
President, confirmed by the Senate, and selected to represent a
range of expertise and perspectives. Independent scientific and
technical oversight of the nuclear waste management program is
essential and should continue to be provided for out of nuclear
waste fee payments. In addition, the presence of clearly independent,
competent regulators is essential.'
Finally in response to criticism of fixed deadlines, the final report recognised
a criticism of such deadlines in Fuel Cycle by stating:
'Obviously there is an inherent tension between recommending an
adaptive, consent-based process and setting out deadlines or progress
requirements in advance. But we agree that it will be important without imposing inflexible deadlines - to set reasonable performance
goals and milestones for major phases of program development and
implementation so that Congress can hold the waste management
organization accountable and so that stakeholders and the public can
58
59

Ibid ix.
Ibid x.
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have confidence the program is moving forward.'6 0

'... [O]ne of the most telling statements'
Perhaps one of the most telling statements in Fuel Cycle comes in the very first
pages of the book: 'The history shows that the most important and difficult
challenges are not technical but political, institutional, and social.' 6 ' This
observation could apply beyond the nuclear waste debate to so many other
aspects of our nation's dilemma over developing sustainable energy sources.
Although we have been struggling with nuclear waste for over half a
century, we can only hope that the recommendations laid out by Fuel Cycle
and the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future make a
difference this time. If not, broader ethical issues are raised: will unchecked
consumption of energy and uncompromising rejection of solutions that have
an impact on us locally leave future generations, who had no part in creating
these wastes, with a toxic legacy that has no solution?

KK DuVivier
Professorof Law,
University of Denver Sturm College of Law, Denver Colorado, US

kduvivier@law.du.edu
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Ibid.
Stewart and Stewart, note 12 above, 4.

